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This article presents several principles that have guided our thinking about emotional 
intelligence, some of them new. We have reformulated our original ability model here guided by 
these principles, clarified earlier statements of the model that were unclear, and revised portions 
of it in response to current research. In this revision, we also positioned emotional intelligence 
amidst other hot intelligences including personal and social intelligences, and examined the 
implications of the changes to the model.  We discuss the present and future of the concept of 
emotional intelligence as a mental ability.   
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The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence:  
Principles and Updates 
 
In 1990, two of us proposed the existence of a new intelligence, called “emotional 
intelligence.” Drawing on research findings in the areas of emotion, intelligence, psychotherapy, 
and cognition, we suggested that some people might be more intelligent about emotions than 
others (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189). We called attention to people’s problem solving in 
areas related to emotion: recognizing emotions in faces, understanding the meanings of emotion 
words, and managing feelings, among others. We argued that, collectively, such skills implied 
the existence of a broader, overlooked capacity to reason about emotions: an emotional 
intelligence (Cacioppo, Semin, & Berntson, 2004; Haig, 2005).We then characterized the 
problem-solving people carried out as falling into four areas or “branches” (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997). 
In the present article, we revisit the theoretical aspects of our ability model of emotional 
intelligence, update the model so as to enhance its usefulness, and examine its implications. We 
begin by considering a set of principles that guide our thinking about emotional intelligence. 
After discussing these principles, we revise the four-branch model slightly. We then locate 
emotional intelligence amidst related “broad” intelligences, taking care to distinguish emotional 
intelligence from personal and social intelligences, and elucidate examples of reasoning for each 
one of these intelligences. Finally, we wrap up by considering the influence of the model and its 
implications for the future.  
 
Seven Principles of Emotional Intelligence 
 
 We will describe a set of principles that have guided our theorizing about emotional 
intelligence. Together, these principles—guidelines really—succinctly represent how we think 
about emotional intelligence.   
Principle 1: Emotional Intelligence Is a Mental Ability 
Like most psychologists, we regard intelligence as the capacity to carry out abstract 
reasoning: to understand meanings, to grasp the similarities and differences between two 
concepts, to formulate powerful generalizations, and to understand when generalizations may not 
be appropriate because of context (Carroll, 1993; Gottfredson, 1997). We agree also that 
intelligence can be regarded as a system of mental abilities (Detterman, 1982).  
Regarding how people reason about emotions, we proposed that emotionally intelligent 
people (a) perceive emotions accurately, (b) use emotions to accurately facilitate thought, (c) 
understand emotions and emotional meanings and (d) manage emotions in themselves and others 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
Principle 2: Emotional Intelligence Is Best Measured As an Ability 
A key component of our thinking is that intelligences are best measured as abilities—by 
posing problems for people to solve, and examining the resulting patterns of correct answers 
(Mayer, 2015). (Correct answers are those that authorities identify within the problem-solving 
area.) The best answers to a question can be recognized by consulting reference works, 
convening a panel of experts, or (more controversially for certain classes of problems), by 
identifying a general consensus among the test-takers (Legree, Psotka, Tremble, & Bourne, 
2005; MacCann & Roberts, 2008; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003).  
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People are poor at estimating their own levels of intelligence—whether it is their general 
intelligence or their emotional intelligence (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006; 
Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998). Because people lack knowledge of what good problem solving 
actually entails, they estimate their abilities on other bases. These include a non-informative mix 
of general self-confidence, self-esteem, misunderstandings of what is involved in successful 
reasoning, and wishful thinking. These non-intellectual features add construct-irrelevant variance 
to their self-estimated abilities, rendering them invalid as indices of their actual abilities (Joint 
Committee, 2014).  
Principle 3: Intelligent Problem Solving Does Not Correspond Neatly to Intelligent 
Behavior 
We believe there is a meaningful distinction between intelligence and behavior. A 
person’s behavior is an expression of that individual’s personality in a given social context 
(Mischel, 2009). An individual’s personality includes motives and emotions, social styles, self-
awareness, and self-control, all of which contribute to consistencies in behavior, apart from 
intelligence. Among the Big Five personality traits, for example, extraversion, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness correlate near zero with general intelligence. Neuroticism correlates at r = -
.15, and openness about r = .30 (DeYoung, 2011). The Big Five exhibit correlations of similar 
magnitude with emotional intelligence: Neuroticism correlates r = -.17 with emotional 
intelligence and openness r = .18; extraversion and conscientiousness correlate with emotional 
intelligence between r = .12 to .15, and agreeableness, r = .25 (Joseph & Newman, 2010). These 
correlations indicate the relative independence of intelligences from socioemotional styles. They 
confirm what everyday observation suggests: that emotionally stable, outgoing, and 
conscientious people may be emotionally intelligent or not.  
Similarly, a person may possess high analytical intelligence but not deploy it— 
illustrating a gap between ability and achievement (Duckworth, Quinn, & Tsukayama, 2012; 
Greven, Harlaar, Kovas, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Plomin, 2009). Intelligence tests tend to 
measure potential better than the typical performance of everyday behavior. Many people with 
high levels of intelligence may not deploy their ability when it would be useful (Ackerman & 
Kanfer, 2004). For these reasons, the prediction from intelligence to individual instances of 
“smart” behavior is fraught with complications and weak in any single instance (Ayduk & 
Mischel, 2002; Sternberg, 2004). At the same time, more emotionally intelligent people have 
outcomes that differ in important ways from those who are less emotionally intelligent. They 
have better interpersonal relationships both in their everyday lives and on the job—as articles in 
this issue and elsewhere address (Izard et al., 2001; Karim & Weisz, 2010; Mayer, Roberts, & 
Barsade, 2008; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008; Roberts et al., 2006; Rossen & Kranzler, 2009; 
Trentacosta, Izard, Mostow, & Fine, 2006)  
Although intelligences predict some long-term behavioral outcomes, predicting any 
individual behavior is fraught with uncertainty because of the other personality—and social— 
variables involved (Funder, 2001; Mischel, 2009). 
Principle 4: A Test’s Content—the Problem Solving Area Involved—Must Be Clearly 
Specified as a Precondition for its Measurement of Human Mental Abilities 
 Establishing the Content of the Area. To measure emotional intelligence well, tests must 
sample from the necessary subject matter; the content of the test must cover the area of problem-
solving (Joint Committee, 2014). A test of verbal intelligence ought to sample from a wide range 
of verbal problems in order to assess a test-taker’s problem-solving ability. Test developers 
therefore must cover the key areas of verbal problem-solving required, such as understanding 
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vocabulary, comprehending sentences and other, similar skills. The specification of a problem-
solving area—vocabulary, sentence comprehension, and the like for verbal reasoning—defines 
the intelligence and its range of application. The content specification is designed to ensure that 
the test samples a representative group of problems. 
 Subject Matter Differs from Ability. Once the test’s content is established, the test can be 
used to identify a person’s mental abilities. People’s problem-solving abilities are reflected by 
the correlational (or covariance) structure of the responses they make to the test items. People’s 
abilities are revealed when a group of scores on test-items rise and fall together across a sample 
of individuals. Note that the mental abilities measured by a test are independent to some degree 
from the nature of the problems to be solved. That is, a person’s abilities will not necessarily 
correspond directly to the different types of content in a subject area—a matter we consider 
further in the next principle. 
Principle 5: Valid Tests have Well-Defined Subject Matter that Draws out Relevant 
Human Mental Abilities  
People exhibit their reasoning abilities as they solve problems within a given subject area. 
As such, a test’s validity depends both on the content it samples and the human mental abilities it 
elicits. From this perspective, test scores represent an interaction between a person’s mental 
abilities and the to-be solved problems. If the test content is poorly specified, the items will 
misrepresent the domain, and any hoped-for research understanding of mental abilities may be 
inconclusive. If problem-solving domains overlap too much with other areas, ability factors 
redundant with other areas may emerge; if the test content is too broad, eclectic sets of ability 
factors may arise, and if the content is too narrow the test may fail to draw out key mental 
abilities. A garbage-in, garbage-out process will replace good measurement. 
As implied above, human abilities do not necessarily map directly onto test content: The 
abilities people use to solve problems have their own existence independent of the organization 
of the subject matter involved. In the intelligence field, a test of verbal knowledge may ask a 
person questions about non-fiction passages, fiction, poetry, and instruction manuals. Despite the 
diversity of material, people use just one verbal intelligence to comprehend them all. On the 
other hand, the skill to identify what is missing in a picture and the skill to rotate an object in 
space (in our minds) appear to draw on the same visual understanding. However, identifying the 
missing part of a picture draws primarily on perceptual-organizational intelligence whereas the 
object-rotation task draws primarily on spatial ability, and these mental abilities are distinct 
(Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009). As applied to emotional intelligence, we need both to 
describe accurately the emotional problem solving that people undertake and the abilities people 
employ to solve those problems—which are two different matters (Joint Committee, 2014). 
Principle 6: Emotional Intelligence is a Broad Intelligence. 
We view emotional intelligence as a “broad” intelligence. The concept of broad 
intelligences emerges from a hierarchical view of intelligence often referred to as the Cattell-
Horn-Carroll or “three-stratum model” (McGrew, 2009). In this model, general intelligence, or g, 
resides at the top of the hierarchy, and it is divided at the second stratum into a series of eight to 
fifteen broad intelligences (Flanagan, McGrew, & Ortiz, 2000; McGrew, 2009). The model is 
based on factor-analytic explorations of how mental abilities correlate with one another. Such 
analyses suggest that human thinking can be fruitfully divided into areas such as fluid reasoning, 
comprehension-knowledge (similar to verbal intelligence), visual-spatial processing, working 
memory, long-term storage and retrieval, and speed of retrieval. The three-stratum model also 
includes at its lowest level more specific mental abilities. For example, the broad intelligence, 
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“comprehension-knowledge” includes the specific ability to understand vocabulary and general 
knowledge about the world.  
Broad intelligences fall into subclasses (McGrew, 2009; Schneider & Newman, 2015). 
One class of broad intelligences reflects basic functional capacities of the brain such as mental 
processing speed and the scope of working memory. A second class of broad intelligences such 
as auditory intelligence and tactile/physical intelligence is distinguishable by the sensory system 
with which it is most closely associated. Still others may reflect subject matter knowledge such 
as verbal intelligence. Mental abilities in late adolescence and adulthood may be shaped and 
strengthened into “aptitude complexes” by educational pursuits and interests to form domain-
specific knowledge such as in mathematics, sciences, or government and history (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999). 
Emotional intelligence fits such descriptions of a broad intelligence. MacCann, Joseph, 
Newman and Roberts (2014) collected data on 702 students who took a wide range of 
intelligence tests, including one of emotional intelligence, over an eight-hour testing period. 
Using confirmatory factor analysis, MacCann et al. (2014) found that emotional intelligence, 
indicated by three of the four branches of the Mayer, Salovey, Caruso Emotional Intelligence 
Test (MSCEIT, Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), fit well among other known broad 
intelligences within the second-stratum of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model. In a reanalysis of the 
same data, Legree et al. (2014) were also able to fit emotional intelligence into the Cattell-Horn-
Carroll framework; they included all four branches of the MSCEIT as indicators of emotional 
intelligence by correcting for the different response scales used across the test’s subtasks (Legree 
et al., 2014). 
Principle 7: Emotional Intelligence is a Member of the Class of Broad Intelligences Focused 
on Hot Information Processing 
We believe that the broad intelligences—especially those defined by their subject 
matter—can be divided into hot and cool sets. Cool intelligences are those that deal with 
relatively impersonal knowledge such as verbal-propositional intelligence, math abilities, and 
visual-spatial intelligence. We view hot intelligences as involving reasoning with information of 
significance to an individual—matters that may chill our hearts or make our blood boil. People 
use these hot intelligences to manage what matters most to them: their senses of social 
acceptance, identity coherence, and emotional well being. Repeated failures to reason well in 
these areas lead to psychic pain which—at intense levels—is co-processed in the same brain 
centers that process physical pain (Eisenberger, 2015). By thinking clearly about feelings, 
personality, and social groups, however, people can better evaluate, cope with, and predict the 
consequences of their own actions, and the behavior of the individuals around them. 
Emotional intelligence falls within this category because emotions are organized 
responses involving physical changes, felt experiences, cognitions, and action plans—all with 
strong evaluative components (Izard, 2010). Social intelligence is another member of the 
category (Conzelmann, Weis, & Süß, 2013; Hoepfner & O'Sullivan, 1968; Weis & Süß, 2007; 
Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995). Social intelligence is “hot” because social acceptance is 
fundamentally important to us; among social animals, group exclusion is a source of primal pain 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Finally, personal intelligence—an intelligence about personality—
is a newly proposed member of this group (Mayer, 2008; Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012; Mayer, 
2014). Personal intelligence is a hot intelligence because our sense of self is a primary source of 
inner pleasure and pain—ranging from self-satisfaction and pride on the positive side to self-
loathing and suicidal thoughts and action on the negative side (Freud, 1962; Greenwald, 1980).  
THE ABILITY MODEL OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE    6 
 
Summary and Applications 
 In this section, we described seven principles that guide our thinking about emotional 
intelligence. We employed some of these principles—notably that emotional intelligence is an 
ability and a hot intelligence—from the outset of our work. We also introduced some new 
principles, such as those concerning broad intelligences. In the next section, we review the four-
branch model of emotional intelligence and present an updated view of our model and of our 
present thinking, recognizing that these principles could lead to other models as well.  
 
  The Four-Branch Model: Original and Revised 
 
 In this section of the paper, we briefly revisit our 1997 four-branch model of emotional 
intelligence and then proceed to renew it—as well as to clarify its range of usefulness in the 
context of the field’s current understanding of intelligences. More specifically, we (a) add more 
abilities to the model, (b) distinguish the four-branch model of problem-solving content from the 
structure of human abilities relevant to emotional intelligence, (c) relate emotional intelligence to 
closely-allied broad intelligences, (d) examine the key characteristics of the problem-solving 
involved, and (e) more clearly distinguish between areas of problem-solving and areas of human 
mental abilities.  
The Four-Branch Model of Emotional Intelligence 
 Our four-branch ability model distinguished among four branches of problem-solving 
necessary to carry out emotional reasoning: The first was (a) perceiving emotions, which we 
regarded as computationally most basic. We then proceeded through the increasingly integrated 
and more cognitively complex areas of (b) facilitating thought by using emotions, (c) 
understanding emotions, and (d) managing emotions in oneself and others (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997). (We referred to these problem-solving areas as branches after the line drawing in our 
original diagram).  
Each branch represents a group of skills that proceeds developmentally from basic tasks 
to more challenging ones. The perceiving emotions branch leads off with the “ability to identify 
emotions in one’s physical states, feelings, and thoughts,” and proceeds to such developmentally 
advanced tasks (as we saw them then) as the ability to discriminate between truthful and 
dishonest expressions of feeling. The parallel developmental progression in the Understanding 
branch begins with the ability to label emotions and progressed to more challenging tasks such as 
understanding “likely transitions among emotions,” such as from anger to satisfaction. 
Update 1. The Model Includes More Problem-Solving Abilities than Before 
 Table 1 recapitulates the four branches of the original model in its four rows, from 
perceiving emotions to managing emotions (see left column). To the right, we have included 
many of the original specific types of reasoning that illustrated each branch, sometimes rewriting 
them for clarity. Within a row, each set of abilities is arranged, very approximately, from the 
simplest to the most complex skills (from bottom to top).  
  
  








• Effectively manage other’s emotions to achieve a desired outcomeb 
• Effectively manage one’s own emotions to achieve a desired outcomeb 
• Evaluate strategies to maintain, reduce or intensify an emotional responseb 
• Monitor emotional reactions to determine their reasonableness 
• Engage with emotions if they are helpful; disengage if not 
• Stay open to pleasant and unpleasant feelings, as needed, and to the 
information they convey  
3. Understanding 
Emotions 
• Recognize cultural differences in the evaluation of emotionsc 
• Understand how a person might feel in the future or under certain 
conditions (affective forecasting)c 
• Recognize likely transitions among emotions such as from anger to 
satisfaction 
• Understand complex and mixed emotions 
• Differentiate between moods and emotionsc 
• Appraise the situations that are likely to elicit emotionsc  
• Determine the antecedents, meanings, and consequences of emotions 




• Select problems based on how one’s ongoing emotional state might 
facilitate cognition  
• Leverage mood swings to generate different cognitive perspectives  
• Prioritize thinking by directing attention according to present feeling 
• Generate emotions as a means to relate to experiences of another personc  
• Generate emotions as an aid to judgment and memory 
1. Perceiving 
Emotion 
• Identify deceptive or dishonest emotional expressionsb  
• Discriminate accurate vs inaccurate emotional expressionsb 
• Understand how emotions are displayed depending on context and 
culturec 
• Express emotions accurately when desired 
• Perceive emotional content in the environment, visual arts, and musicb 
• Perceive emotions in other people through their vocal cues, facial 
expression, language, and behaviorb 
• Identify emotions in one’s own physical states, feelings, and thoughts 
a The bullet-points are based on Mayer & Salovey (1997) except as indicated in footnotes b and c. The 
bulleted items are ordered bottom-to-top within a row (very roughly) from simplest to most complex 
problem solving involved. Please note that the Four-Branch Model depicts the problem-solving areas of 
emotional intelligence and is not intended to correspond to the factor structure of the area. 
b An ability from the original model was divided into two or more separate abilities.  
c A new ability was added. 
d  Note that the Branch 2 abilities can be further divided into the areas of generating emotions to facilitate 
thought (bottom two bulleted items) and tailoring thinking to emotion (the top three bulleted items). 
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Based on research since 1997, we have added several areas of problem solving to this 
revised model that initially we overlooked. For example, the “Understanding Emotion” area 
originally included the abilities to label emotions, to know their causes and consequences, and to 
understand complex emotions. To those original areas of understanding, we have added 
emotional appraisal and emotional forecasting—topics that have experienced increased research 
attention and that have been directly related to emotionally intelligent reasoning (see also Barrett, 
Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007; 
MacCann & Roberts, 2008), as well as a sensitivity to cultural contexts (Matsumoto & Hwang, 
2012). As others have pointed out, reasoning in an individual area is not necessarily discrete; 
rather, problem-solving activities can spill or cascade into one another. For example, emotion 
perception is often helpful to accurate emotion understanding (see Joseph & Newman, 2010).   
 
Update 2: The Mental Abilities Involved in Emotional Intelligent Reasoning Remain To-
Be-Determined  
 When we first proposed the four-branch model, we believed it could reasonably 
correspond to four mental ability factors in the area (Mayer &Salovey, 1997). That said, the 
content domains are independent of the mental abilities within the domain (by Principles Four 
and Five). In fact, the four-branch model is not well reflected in the factor structure of our 
ability-based measures (Legree et al., 2014; Maul, 2011; Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough, 
2005; Rossen, Kranzler, & Algina, 2008).  
From an empirical standpoint, tasks on the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) have been represented by between one and three factors (Legree et 
al., 2014; MacCann et al., 2014). Those theorists who favor a three-factor model have argued 
that Branch 2, Using Emotions to Facilitate Thought, be dropped because psychometric models 
of the test that try to model those tasks do not fit well (Joseph & Newman, 2010).   
We agree that the empirical evidence is reasonably clear that no mental ability factor 
related to Using Emotions to Facilitate Thought (Branch 2) emerges from the problem solving 
areas of the MSCEIT. This may be a failure of the test construction, or because people solve 
Branch 2 problems using their ability at emotional understanding (or another ability) rather than 
any reasoning distinctly related to Using Emotions. Whatever the reason, no strong evidence 
exists for a Using Emotions factor.  
Given the empirical findings, should Using Emotions (Branch 2) be dropped as a subject 
area? We believe it makes sense to include Using Emotions in specifying the content of 
emotional intelligence because Using Emotions may well increase one’s intelligence—and that is 
relevant to emotional intelligence. Knowing that it often makes more sense to do detail-oriented 
work when one is sad rather than happy—and that creativity burgeons with happiness—seems to 
us integral to the construct (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), and additional findings point to 
the idea that people use inner emotional states to solve problems (Cohen & Andrade, 2004; 
Leung et al., 2014) 
 But if Branch 2 helps specify the problem-solving content of the area, it does not map on 
to any empirical findings of relevant latent abilities (Haig, 2005). For that reason, the Using 
Emotions scale of the MSCEIT, for example, represents emotional intelligence in general, but 
lacks evidence for its specific structural validity. The four-branch model of emotional 
intelligence is a useful demarcation of the problem-solving content of the area. In this instance, 
however, the mental abilities involved in solving problems in emotional intelligence do not 
appear to coincide with the four areas.  
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Update 3. Emotional Intelligence Is A Broad Intelligence and Invites Comparisons and 
Contrasts with Related Hot Intelligences Such as Social and Personal Intelligences  
 In our early works we sometimes wrote that emotional intelligence was similar to social 
intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and at other times we described 
emotional intelligence as sui generis—it did not appear to be like any other intelligence—surely 
nothing in the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model as originally formulated. Neither of these positions 
appear helpful today.   
Today, we believe there exists a group of hot intelligences of which emotional 
intelligence is a member. Two other candidates for this group are social intelligence and personal 
intelligence (see Principle 7). Some of these intelligences are better understood than others.   
Social intelligence has been the most challenging to measure (Conzelmann et al., 2013; 
Romney & Pyryt, 1999; Wong et al., 1995). Work conducted early in the 20th century indicated 
that social intelligence correlated so highly with general intelligence as to be indistinguishable 
from it (Wyer & Srull, 1989). Recent research bears this out: Conzelmann, Weis and Süß (2007) 
found that both social memory and social perception appeared to blend into general intelligence, 
consistent with earlier studies. They also found, however, more promising evidence for an 
independent social understanding task.  
Another currently researched member of this group is personal intelligence: the capacity 
to reason about personalities—both one’s own and the personalities of others. There is now 
preliminary evidence that personal intelligence can be measured, exists, and predicts 
consequential outcomes (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2015b; Mayer et al., 2012).  
The existence of other hot broad intelligences that form a group with emotional 
intelligence arguably does more to jeopardize the conceptual integrity of emotional intelligence 
than any other development in the past 25 years. After all, if emotional intelligence were just a 
part of the arguably broader personal intelligence, and could not be distinguished from it 
empirically, then emotional intelligence might need to be subsumed into that broader 
intelligence. It is for that reason that we focus next on a comparative examination of these hot 
intelligences.  
 Comparative definitions. To fully understand emotional intelligence, it helps to think 
about its relationship to personal and social intelligences. Emotional, personal, and social 
intelligences share in common their concern for the human world of inner experience and outer 
relationships. That is, they concern the understanding of people from their biosocial needs to 
their interactions in social groups. To compare these intelligences, we provide working 
definitions of each one in the first row of Table 2. Emotional intelligence is defined as “The 
ability to reason validly with emotions and with emotion-related information and to use emotions 
to enhance thought” (Table 2, column 2). Similar definitions are offered for personal and social 
intelligences. Definitions can provide a helpful start to specifying the members of the class of hot 
intelligences.  
 Problem-Solving Areas Involved. The three intelligences can be specified in a second 
way by describing each one’s area of problem-solving. Emotional intelligence draws on 
problems described in the four branch model. Personal intelligence has similarly been divided 
into four problem solving areas (Table 2, column 3) that include (a) identifying personality-
related information, (b) forming models of personality, (c) guiding personal choices and (d) 
systematizing life goals and plans (Mayer, 2009). Once again, we remind readers that (as we now 
view it) problem-solving areas do not necessarily predict the structure of mental abilities used to 
find solutions to those problems. In fact, the evidence indicates that simpler models may describe 
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mental abilities in both emotional and personal intelligences (Legree et al., 2014; MacCann et al., 
2014; Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2014).  
 
Table 2  
 




Type of Hot Intelligence 
Emotional Personal Social 
Brief Definition The ability to reason 
validly with emotions and 
with emotion-related 
information, and to use 
emotions to enhance 
thought.  
The ability to reason about 
personality—both our own and 
the personalities of others—
including about motives and 
emotions, thoughts and 
knowledge, plans and styles of 
action, and awareness and self-
control. 
The ability to understand social 
rules, customs, and 
expectations, social situations 
and the social environment, 
and to recognize the exercise of 
influence and power in social 
hierarchies. It also includes an 





• Identify emotional 
content in faces, 
voices, and designs 
and ability to 
accurately express 
emotions 
• Facilitate thinking by 
drawing on emotions 
as motivational and 
substantive inputs 
• Understand the 
meaning of emotions 
and their implications 
for behavior 
• Manage emotions in 
oneself and others 
• Identify information about 
personality, including 
introspection into one’s 
feelings and reading 
personality from faces 
• Form models of personality 
including labeling traits in 
ourselves and others and 
recognizing defensive 
thinking 
• Guide personal choices 
with inner awareness, 
including discovering 
personal interests and 
making personality-relevant 
decisions 
• Systematize plans and 
goals, including finding a 
satisfying life direction and 
meaning  
• Identify group 
memberships: recognize 
dyadic relationships; 
understand group relations 
such as age, gender, ethnic, 
socio-economic and other 
groups 
• Identify social dominance 
and other power dynamics 
among groups 
• Understand contributors to 
group morale, cohesion, 
and dissolution 
• Understand how groups use 
power among one another 
• Recognize and understand 
the exercise of leadership 
and group power 
Aims of 
Reasoning 
• To achieve desired 
emotional states and 
experiences in oneself 
and others 
• To attain goals of self-
development, effective 
personal action, and desired 
interactions with others 
• To achieve membership 
status in  preferred groups, 
and to influence the 
reputation of the group in a 
desired way 
 
The problem solving areas for social intelligence are less well demarcated. From our 
standpoint, Conzelmann et al. (2013) examined something closer to personal intelligence than 
social intelligence in their operationalization of social understanding: They asked test-takers to 
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guess the background information of a target person and to judge the person’s mental states 
(including emotions and thoughts). A definition of social intelligence that better distinguishes it 
from emotional and personal intelligences would focus on reasoning about groups and 
relationships between individuals and groups. The relevant areas of reasoning, as we see them, 
are shown in Table 2, column 3.  
Update 4: Positioning Emotional Intelligence Among Other Hot Intelligences 
 Emotional intelligence, personal intelligence and social intelligence can be “positioned” 
amidst one another in different ways. We suspect that the three intelligences themselves—
emotional, personal and social—may each be of comparable complexity in that they all involve 
human cognitive reasoning of an equally sophisticated nature.  
At the same time, the problem-solving they address—about emotions, personality 
characteristics, and social processes—concern systems at three different levels of complexity: 
emotions are relatively small psychological subsystems; personality exists at the level of the 
whole individual; social organizations involve groups of people. More formally, the phenomena 
being reasoned about occupy different levels along the biopsychosocial continuum, with 
emotions lowest and social systems highest (Engel, 1977; Sheldon, Cheng, & Hilpert, 2011).  
One matter that remains indeterminate is, therefore, whether all three intelligences can be 
considered broad intelligences, or whether, alternatively, emotional intelligence (because it 
concerns the smallest system) is a specific ability within personal (or social) intelligence. For 
now, it seems reasonable to keep them separate until such a time as mathematical models 
indicate that models that nest them yield a superior fit.  
 Finally, all three intelligences concern understanding the human world, and yet, because 
their topic areas are sufficiently diverse, the capacity to reason in each area may be somewhat 
independent of one another. Some people may possess considerable social intelligence without 
having a good deal of emotional intelligence; some people may possess personal intelligence 
without social intelligence. That said, most people will employ the intelligences in an intertwined 
fashion. It is easier to understand personality if one has a reasonable feel for a person’s emotions; 
easier to understand people if one understands the social systems they operate within, and so 
forth. These relationships explain why the intelligences—even though they can be defined in 
discrete terms to a considerable degree—are likely to correlate at substantial levels.     
Update 5: Specifying the Problem Analyses of the Broad Intelligences 
Whatever the structure of human intelligences turns out to be, demarcating the reasoning 
involved is important to educating people so as to improve their problem solving in the area—
and also may contribute to the implementation of formal problem solving in the area using 
artificial intelligence. Our model can be expanded to describe the units, operators, and solutions 
of each intelligence that people manipulate to analyze a problem. Our concept of problem 
analysis borrows heavily from Newell and Simon’s (1972) concept of the “problem space”. Their 
aim was to show “in detail how the processes that occur in human problem solving can be 
compounded out of elementary information processes…” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p. 
152).  
People create a mental problem space when they recognize and encode a problem they 
hope to solve. Within the problem space, they specify the criteria for a correct solution, as well 
as rules to solve it by. Individuals may also set up intermediate stages of problem solving: parts 
of the problem that can be solved individually and are likely to contribute to an ultimate solution 
(Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 59). In Newell et al.’s formulation, people solve problems by 
identifying: (a) a finite set of information (items, relationships among them, and knowledge 
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about them), (b) a small and finite set of operators, and (c) a small number of alternative possible 
solutions (Newell & Simon, 1972, pp. 810-811). Related models of intelligence that anticipate 
such divisions—or are influenced by them—include Guilford’s Structure of Intellect Model and 
the Berlin Model of Intelligence both of which pair operators with contents (Beauducel & 
Kersting, 2002; Guilford, 1966; 1988). 
These approaches from human and artificial intelligence share the idea that test takers 
have a certain amount of information at their disposal, can operate on that information in certain 
valid ways and come up with a set of possible answers. Consequently, specifying the units, 
operators, and solutions to a specific problem further helps to describe the problem-solving 
intrinsic to a given task.  
A proposed problem space for emotional and personal intelligences is provided in Table 
3. For example, a person might apply emotional intelligence to the question of whether a friend 
is sad. To answer the question, the person will draw on units that include facial expressions, tone 
of voice, mood-congruent judgment and situational appraisals. The problem-solver then operates 
on those units given a specific problem. For example, by perceiving her friend’s flaccid facial 
expression, understanding a setback he suffered, and hearing his negative attitude, she is likely to 
conclude her friend is sad. A parallel breakdown is specified in Table 3 for an example pertinent 
to personal intelligence.  
Such analyses point out how the hot intelligences emphasize somewhat different units of 
analysis. For emotions, the units involve facial expressions, emotions, and mood-congruent 
judgment; for personal intelligence, traits, behaviors, and relationship status are important. Each 
of the hot intelligences is likely to emphasize different classes of units—although there is some 
overlap as well: Both emotional and personal intelligence make use of situation understanding.  
Educators, intelligence researchers and computer scientists can make use of these 
analyses. For example, educators can develop new curricula that focus on the units of problem 
solving and that explain the varieties of reasoning involved; educators who understand the units 




 Twenty-five years after its introduction, a good deal of evidence has accumulated that 
emotional intelligence exists as a mental ability among the class of hot, broad intelligences. 
Ability measures of emotional intelligence are still evolving, and the factor structure of the area 
remains uncertain—although support exists for both one- and three-factor models (Legree et al., 
2014; MacCann et al., 2014). Emotional intelligence could turn out to be a part of a larger 
personal or social intelligence. We further know that emotional intelligence predicts important 
outcomes.  
If emotional intelligence is a discrete intelligence, we need to make the case that there has 
evolved a separate reasoning capacity to understand emotions. In fact, there is some evidence to 
support this idea. For example Heberlein and colleagues showed that the brain areas responsible 
for perceiving emotional expressions—happiness, fear and anger—are to a degree distinct from 
the brain areas for perceiving expressions of personality—shyness, warmth and unfriendliness 
(Heberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2004; Heberlein & Saxe, 2005).  
  




Examples of Problem Analysis in the Realms of Emotional and Personal Intelligences 
 
 Emotional Intelligence  Personal Intelligence 
 Key Members of the 
Sets 
Example of a  
Specific Problem 
 Key Members of the 
Sets 




Perceive a person’s 
emotion 
Does a friend feel sad?  Understand a person’s 
likely behavior 
Is a colleague at work 
vengeful toward a 
coworker? 
Units involved Emotional facial 
expressions 
The friend’s mouth is 
downturned 
 Relationship status 
Situations 
The coworker insulted the 
colleague in public  
Postural changes The friend’s movements 
are slowed down 
 Behaviors The colleague fails to pass 
on potentially helpful 




The friend is critical and 




The colleague is generally 
helpful to other coworkers 
Situational appraisals The friend just lost a 
relationship with a 
loved one 







The friend has a sad 
facial expression 
 Translating a trait into a 
likely behavior 
The colleague would 
normally have remembered 
to share the information 
 Recognizing a loss 
can lead to sadness 
 
The friend’s lost love is 
likely to make him feel 
sad 
 Identifying possible 
alternative traits and 
goals 
The colleague could be 
careless, vengeful or 
forgetful 
 Knowing how an 
emotion will change 
with time 
He will likely cheer up 
with time 
 Evaluating two goals 
for the conflicts 
between them 
The colleague often likes to 
be helpful but the pattern of 
events and actions fits a 




information leads to a 
“best guess” 
solution/prediction 
Yes, the situation and 
the facial expression 
converge on the idea the 
friend is sad 
 Converging information 
leads to a “best guess” 
solution/prediction  
Yes, the colleague acted 
vengefully against the 
coworker because of the 
insult   
 
Correlations among broad intelligence range greatly. In one study of ours, spatial and 
personal intelligences, which are conceptually very distinct, correlated r = .23 (Mayer & 
Skimmyhorn, 2015a); in another, personal intelligence and aspects of emotional intelligence 
were related r = .69 suggesting they are closely related intelligences (Mayer et al., 2012).  
Thus, there is the possibility that emotional intelligence seamlessly operates as part a 
broader personal or social intelligence, or a combined socio-emotional-personal intelligence. In 
this instance, there would be nothing special or unique about an individual’s ability to reason 
about emotions; rather, it would be part of a broader reasoning about human nature. In that 
eventuality, the construction of tests of emotional intelligence would be nothing more than the 
construction of a subscale of a broader test. 
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Twenty-five years after the fact, our view is fairly sanguine: We believe that it is likely 
emotional intelligence will be partly distinct from both personal and social intelligences. Even if 
it is not, there has been much to gain and little to lose from working out the reasoning employed 
to understand emotions. Emotional intelligence has helped to codify at least some of the 
abundance of emotion research from the 1970s forward, indicating that there are indeed rules for 
reasoning about emotions and that knowing such rules is adaptive.  
 By using the principles developed here to understand how people solve problems in the 
area of emotions, we can improve education in the subject matter. Once the problems in an area 
such as understanding emotions are well-described, educators can teach people how to think 
better about them (Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011; Rivers, Brackett, 
Reyes, Elbertson, & Salovey, 2013). Such understanding also enables computer scientists to 
create expert systems that emulate human reasoning—matters of importance with the growing 
relevance of expert computer systems and robots in our lives. For example, Cambria and 
colleagues describe the common sense computer movement which seeks to construct expert 
systems that contain tacit knowledge about the world of all sorts (Cambria, Hussain, Havasi, & 
Eckl, 2009, p. 253); they hope such machines “extract users’ emotions and attitudes and use this 
information to be able to better interact with them” (Cambria et al., 2009, p. 258). 
Concluding Comments 
People engage with different subject matter when they use hot intelligences. The revised 
four-branch model developed here provides an overview of the problem content involved in 
emotional intelligence; related models covered here outline content for personal and social 
intelligences. These content specifications are relevant to evaluating test coverage in the area, but 
are less relevant as suggestions of the underlying mental abilities that people employ to solve 
problems in the area. 
 The principles stated in this article suggest that it will sometimes make sense to consider 
emotional, personal and social intelligences as a set and to be sensitive to their distinctions and 
overlap. Moreover, just as our understanding of emotional intelligence has depended upon the 
development of ability measures, however imperfect, so must personal, social and related 
intelligences develop their own measures—as is happening now (Allen, Weissman, Hellwig, 
MacCann, & Roberts, 2014; Conzelmann et al., 2013; Mayer et al., 2012; Mayer et al., 2014). 
This will take some time and our measures and our data are always fallible. In 1990 there were 
virtually no data relevant to these topics, whereas now there is some. As Funder (2013, p. 56) has 
reminded us, data are always fallible. The only thing worse than the fallible data we have on 
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